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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

ADDING INSULT TO INJURY: HOW THE ACA’S “FIX” FOR
NURSING HOME COMPARE STAFFING DATA MISSES THE MARK

ABSTRACT
The Baby Boomers are aging, and soon many will require more long-term
health care services, looking to the Nursing Home Compare Website (Website)
to help guide their choices. The staffing rating on the Website, which rates
nursing homes on a scale of one to five, uses a biased formula to generate its
ratings. It counts registered nurses twice, completely excludes other important
care staff, and uses outdated case-mix adjustments left over from the early
1990’s. In light of the pressing need for accurate data but no mechanism to
obtain it, the staffing rating must be eliminated from the Website. Some studies
suggest that the number of registered nurses in a facility directly correlates
with better care, but these studies fail to account for the changing landscape of
nursing home populations and advances in medical technologies.
In order to avoid misleading consumers making nursing home care
decisions, the staffing rating needs to be fixed, but there is no enforcement
mechanism in place to ensure that the Centers for Medicaid and Medicare
Services (CMS) will do so. Faced with the competing pressures of providing
good care within budget constraints while also getting high ratings, nursing
homes have come under scrutiny with allegations that they “game the system”
by submitting false staffing data to the Website. Section 6106 of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act attempts to address this concern by
requiring staffing data to be more controlled, but this mandate fails to solve
any underlying issues. This paper explores these issues behind the staffing
ratings, debunks the dated assumption that more registered nurses inherently
leads to better care, and implores CMS to change its ways so that nursing
home consumers can make accurately informed choices.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Since its inception in 2008, the Five-Star Quality Rating System on the
Nursing Home Compare Website (Website) has been riddled with inaccurate
measures. 1 To address these concerns, the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act (ACA) mandates that the Comptroller General launch an
investigation of the system and present its findings to Congress with
suggestions for improvement. 2 Accordingly, the Government Accountability
Office (GAO), under the direction of the Comptroller General, announced in
August 2015 its plans to investigate the reliability of the rating system. 3 What
remains unclear, however, is whether all concerns will be addressed in such
investigation and whether Congress will act on the findings, as the law does
not require any further action once the GAO presents its findings to Congress. 4
Congressional history indicates that Congress has little concern for enforcing a
particular order to develop reliable data mechanisms, as evidenced by the
failed mandate of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 (OBRA),
which required a valid method to be created for assessing quality in skilled
nursing facilities. 5
Of paramount concern is the rating system’s explicit bias toward staffing
more registered nurses (RNs). The rating formula factors in the number of RNs
twice, assuming that more RNs on staff necessarily creates better care. 6 This
assumption is flawed because many patients, such as those with dementia, need
more attention paid to their activities of daily living (ADL) than complex
medical conditions. 7 An increase in RN hours does not necessarily lead to
better health outcomes in this population. But in order to have good staffing
ratings, facilities find themselves under pressure to increase their RN staff. 8
Thus, the bias toward RN staffing has a directly opposite effect than
intended—a decrease in the quality of care for some of this country’s most
vulnerable people. In an attempt to make the staffing ratings more accurate,
section 6106 of the ACA requires all nursing homes to submit their staffing

1. Malcolm J. Harkins, III, The Broken Promise of OBRA ‘87: The Failure to Validate
Survey Data Protocol, 8 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 89, 118 (2014).
2. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 11-148, § 6107, 124 Stat. 713
(2010) [hereinafter ACA].
3. Jackie Oberst, GAO to Investigate CMS Five-Star Quality Rating System, PROVIDER
(Aug. 28, 2015), http://www.providermagazine.com/news/Pages/2015/0815/GAO-To-Investigate
-CMSFive-Star-Quality-Rating-System.aspx.
4. See ACA § 6107.
5. See generally Harkins, supra note 1.
6. COMMITTEE ON NURSING HOME REG., INST. OF MED., Improving the Quality of Care in
Nursing Homes 101 (1986) [hereinafter IOM REPORT].
7. See R.S. Bucks et al., Assessment of Activities of Daily Living in Dementia: Development
of the Bristol Activities of Daily Living Scale, 25 AGE & AGEING 113 (1996).
8. See, e.g., U.S. v. N. Am. Health Care, 2015 WL 6871781 at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2015).
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data in a uniform format so that it can be audited for accuracy. 9 This pressure
imposes financial strain on facilities, decreases job satisfaction of RNs, and
results in lowered quality of care. Unfortunately, the ACA fails to address the
underlying erroneous bias that more RN staff creates better care.
Section II briefly describes the Website and then introduces how the
staffing rating formula is objectively erroneous by double counting RNs and
excluding other important care staff. Instead of counting all types of nursing
home care staff, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), the
entity responsible for collecting and analyzing the data, selectively chooses to
count only those staff that it has identified as preferable. Section III
demonstrates that the formula’s method to adjust for case mix is outdated and
has not been appropriately modified for the types of issues nursing homes
experience today. Next, Section IV argues that in addition to the formula being
incorrect, the concept of merely counting numbers of staff, regardless of which
staff are counted or the accuracy of the count, is not a reliable indicator of
quality. Many other factors influence the care provided in a nursing facility,
like management and workplace environment. 10
Section V discusses the allegations that nursing homes have begun to
“game the system” by submitting false data to the Website and how section
6106 of the ACA attempts to address this concern by requiring staffing data to
be more standardized and scrutinized. This mandate may very well exacerbate
the problem, however, since requiring more accurate data will impose even
greater financial stress on nursing homes. This stress will, in turn, make
addition of more RNs to the payroll more difficult. Lastly, Section VI
emphasizes that there is no mechanism in place to ensure that the staffing
formula is adjusted after the Comptroller General submits its report to
Congress. Although some sort of oversight possibility may exist, the most
practical solution to the problem is to remove the staffing rating from the
Website. CMS has a duty to provide data that is meaningful and accurate, and
the staffing star is neither.
Further, section 6106 requires more resources to be devoted to a faulty
input measure. By removing the staffing star rating, CMS can allow truer
measures of quality to shine on the Website. Finally, this paper concludes by
asserting that now is the time to create a change in the Website. As the
population continues to age and enter skilled nursing facilities, the faulty
information consumers find on the Website may color their entire perception of
the care they or their loved ones will receive, before they have even had a
chance to assess the quality of care for themselves.

9. ACA § 6106.
10. IOM REPORT, supra note 6, at 171.
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II. BACKGROUND
A.

History of Nursing Home Quality Data Analysis

Nursing homes care for very vulnerable people who often suffer from
physical and cognitive ailments that leave them unable to be fully selfsufficient. 11 Current trends indicate that as the Baby Boomers age and require
more long-term health care services, consumers will interact more with nursing
homes and raise fresh concerns about quality of care. 12 Of course, such
concerns are not new.
As part of OBRA in 1987, Congress passed the Nursing Home Reform
Act, which in part mandated that a study be designed and validated within the
next three years that would find a method to properly assess the quality of care
in nursing homes. 13 To start, Congress asked the Institute of Medicine
Committee on Nursing Home Regulation (IOM) to develop recommendations
for improving the quality of care in nursing homes. 14 One aspect concerning
quality of care was determining appropriate staffing ratios for nursing homes. 15
The IOM conducted an extensive project by assessing current research,
interviewing professionals, interpreting regulations, and seeking input from
stakeholders, and it concluded that “[b]ecause of the complexities of case
mix—that is, the widely differing needs of individual residents in the same
facility—prescribing simple staffing ratios clearly is inappropriate.” 16 Further,
the IOM believed that an appropriate remedy to improving quality of care
through staffing would be to increase the ratio of better-trained staff in
facilities, rather than simply increasing the number of staff available. 17 “Bettertrained staff” was loosely implied to mean that both professional and
nonprofessional nursing personnel should be trained in geriatrics to ensure
meeting the needs of all types of residents in each facility. 18

11. Christina Boccuti et al., Reading the Stars: Nursing Home Quality Star Ratings,
Nationally and by State, KAISER FAM. FOUND. 2 (May 2015), http://files.kff.org/attachment/issue
-brief-reading-the-stars-nursing-home-quality-star-ratings-nationally-and-by-state.
12. Carina Storrs, The ‘Elder Orphans’ of the Baby Boom Generation, CNN (May 18, 2015,
4:22 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/05/18/health/elder-orphans/ (stating that in 2012, about 1.3
million Americans lived in nursing homes, but by 2030, the number of residents in nursing homes
is projected to reach 5.3 million people).
13. Harkins, supra note 1, at 90.
14. See IOM REPORT, supra note 6, at 2.
15. Id. at 101.
16. Id. at 102.
17. Id. at 103.
18. Id. The IOM placed emphasis on training in geriatrics, not necessarily on skill or
education level. See IOM REPORT, supra note 6, at 103.
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The validated methods that OBRA hoped to create were to be implemented
for nursing home surveys by January 1, 1990. 19 Prior to this date, an
assessment method for nursing homes was developed, but the method was
never validated. 20 Instead, the mandate prescribed by the Nursing Home
Reform Act was forgotten, despite a clear determination that the current
nursing home survey methods “were inaccurate and not clearly indicative of
quality.” 21 Instead, CMS moved on to a new project: creating an online
platform to display the inaccurate survey data, so that consumers of nursing
home care would rely on the data when trying to make informed nursing home
choices. 22 This platform is now known as Nursing Home Compare, which
includes the Five-Star Quality Rating System. 23 Rather than complying with
OBRA’s mandate to develop more accurate quality indicators, CMS moved in
an opposite direction—publicizing the inaccurate data as reliable indicators of
nursing home quality. In effect, this data publication acts as a marketer of
nursing homes, generating reliance by consumers, practitioners, and anyone
else invested in making informed skilled nursing care decisions. 24
B.

Overview of the Five-Star Quality Rating System

The Website displays four different star ratings for each nursing home:
overall, health inspections, staffing, and quality measures. A brief overview of
each measure is provided below.
STAR RATINGS DISPLAY ON NURSING HOME COMPARE 25

19. Harkins, supra note 1, at 90.
20. See id. at 94.
21. Id. at 119.
22. Id.
23. Donna R. Lenhoff, LTC Regulation and Enforcement: An Overview from the Perspective
of Residents and Their Families, 26 J. LEGAL MED. 9, 18–19 (2005) (stating that “[i]n November,
2002, CMS launched a nationwide Nursing Home Quality Initiative (NHQI) to develop, select,
and report nursing home quality measures. This data is available to consumers on the Nursing
Home Compare website”).
24. Oberst, supra note 3.
25. NURSING HOME COMPARE, https://www.medicare.gov/nursinghomecompare/ (search
zip code “63130”, then arrange results by staffing in ascending order) (last visited Dec. 14, 2016).
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1. Health Inspection Star
State surveys of all facilities are completed at least annually, assessing for
deficiencies in compliance with federal and state requirements. 26 The health
inspection rating is calculated using the three most recent state survey results,
weighting more recent deficiencies heavier and accounting for the number of
re-visits a surveyor is required to make before the problem is solved. 27 Surveys
include, in part, assessments of “medication management, proper skin care,
assessment of resident needs, nursing home administration, environment,
kitchen/food services, and resident rights and quality of life.” 28 CMS uses this
survey data to construct the Five-Star Quality Rating on the Website, despite it
being well established that survey results are inaccurate and unreliable. 29
Further, instead of assigning stars based on an average bell curve distribution,
CMS skews downwards, only awarding the top ten percent a five-star rating
and the bottom twenty percent a one-star rating. 30
2. Staffing Star
The staffing star, which is the focus of this paper, is highly problematic. In
fact, the staffing ratings have been under scrutiny for years, with most
criticisms surrounding the fact that the staffing star ratings rely on facilityreported data, with no measures to check the data’s accuracy (until section
6106’s attempt). 31 The staffing rating consists of two measures: 1) total RN
hours per resident day, and 2) the total of RN, licensed practical nurse (LPN)
or licensed vocational nurse (LVN) (they are essentially the same 32), and nurse
aide (NA) hours per resident day. 33 The two measures are given equal weight

26. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., DESIGN FOR NURSING HOME COMPARE
FIVE-STAR QUALITY RATING SYSTEM: TECHNICAL USERS’ GUIDE 3 (2015) [hereinafter CMS
TECHNICAL USERS’ GUIDE].
27. Id. at 4.
28. Id. at 3–4.
29. Harkins, supra note 1.
30. CMS TECHNICAL USERS’ GUIDE, supra note 26, at 6.
31. See Administration Plans Major Improvements to Nursing Home Compare, CTR. FOR
MEDICARE ADVOCACY, http://www.medicareadvocacy.org/administration-plans-major-improve
ments-to-nursing-home-compare/ (last visited Aug. 8, 2016); Katie Thomas, Medicare Star
Ratings Allow Nursing Homes to Game the System, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2014), https://www.ny
times.com/2014/08/25/business/medicare-star-ratings-allow-nursing-homes-to-game-the-sys
tem.html.
32. LPN and LVN describe the same kind of professional who works under the direction of
an RN. The biggest difference between the two is mere preference in terminology, so for the
purposes of this paper the two terms are identical. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATS., Occupational
Outlook Handbook: Licensed Practical and Licensed Vocational Nurses, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR,
https://www.bls.gov/ooh/healthcare/licensed-practical-and-licensed-vocational-nurses.htm#tab-2
[hereinafter Licensed Practical and Licensed Vocational Nurses].
33. CMS TECHNICAL USERS’ GUIDE, supra note 26, at 7.
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in the overall staffing rating reported on the Website. 34 Put another way, the
staffing formula double counts the RN hours per resident day, creating a
formula that looks (when simplified) like: RN + (RN + LPN + NA) = overall
staffing rating. Recognizing that different types of staff are needed for different
levels of care, the staff numbers are weakly “adjusted for case-mix
differences” by using the Resource Utilization Group (RUG-III) categories. 35
A more detailed description of the staffing formula and case-mix adjustment
will follow later.
3. Quality Star
While the health inspections rating is based on the past three annual
assessments, the quality rating looks at a much shorter time frame—the three
most recent quarters—to assess how well the nursing home is able to meet the
residents’ needs. 36 Arguably, taking care of the residents’ needs should be the
overall quality indicator, as that is the ultimate concern for consumers. 37 And
in all practicality, as long as the nursing home is meeting its residents’ needs, it
may not matter if the facility has fewer staff. Using a complex formula, CMS
analyzes data including increase in residents’ needs for help with ADLs,
pressure ulcers, use of physical restraints, incidences of urinary tract infections,
use of antipsychotic medicines, resident reports of pain, and more. 38 Unlike the
health inspection stars, which are awarded on an asymmetrical bell curve, the
final quality score that a nursing home receives is determined according to
ranges of raw points awarded. 39

34. Id. at 9.
35. Id. at 8; RUG-III groups are classifications of patient needs developed for the purpose of
Medicare payments. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., OEI-02-99-00041, NURSING HOME RESIDENT
ASSESSMENT RESOURCE UTILIZATION GROUPS 3 (2001).
36. CMS TECHNICAL USERS’ GUIDE, supra note 26, at 11.
37. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., YOUR GUIDE TO CHOOSING A NURSING
HOME OR OTHER LONG-TERM CARE 18 (2015).
38. Data for each quality indicator is “risk-adjusted” to accommodate different factors
associated with circumstances unique to different nursing homes. CMS TECHNICAL USERS’
GUIDE, supra note 26, at 11. Then, the adjusted quality indicator data is plugged into a formula:
QM3Quarter = [(QM Q1 * DQ1) + (QMQ2 * DQ2) + (QMQ3 * DQ3)]/(DQ1 + DQ2 + DQ3),
“[w]here QM Q1, QM Q2, and QM Q3 correspond to the adjusted QM values for the three most
recent quarters and DQ1, DQ2, and DQ3 are the denominators (number of eligible residents for
the particular QM) for the same three quarters.” Id. Once the formula is figured for each nursing
home, raw scores are ranked according to quintile, and then each quality indicator’s raw score is
added to get a sum for the nursing home overall. Id. at 13. Scores range between 220 and 1100
points. Id. at 15.
39. Id.
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4. Overall Star
While common sense suggests the overall star rating would be an average
of the individual star ratings, CMS adopts a convoluted method to determine
the overall rating. Starting with the health inspection rating, a star is added or
subtracted based on specific criteria concerning the results of the staffing
component. 40 Then, another star is either added or subtracted based on the
quality measure rating, and barring some exceptions, the overall quality star
rating is figured. 41 To explain its rationale for adding and subtracting stars
instead of averaging, CMS states that it views the health inspection, staffing,
and quality measures ratings as carrying different levels of importance. 42
Despite the established facts that survey results are inaccurate and unreliable 43
and that the staffing rating is erroneous, CMS places ultimate importance on
health inspections and staffing for determining the overall quality rating. 44
C. Portraying Quality of Care
Since its debut in 2008, the Website has been a significant resource for
people to assess their nursing home choices. 45 By being a principal source of
nursing home information, the Website becomes a driver of the market,
strongly influencing consumers’ choices. 46 CMS states that it created the FiveStar Quality Rating System with the purpose of “provid[ing] residents and their
families with an easy way to understand assessment of nursing home quality,
making meaningful distinctions between high and low performing nursing
homes.” 47 Thus, by publicizing data about the quality of care, consumers can
rely on the data to inform their choices as to where their loved one will receive
the best care.
At first glance, the star ratings would have consumers believe that they
reflect the overall quality of care a resident receives in a facility. Quality of
care is a complex concept, however, and not easily summarized in a few stars.
One common conceptual framework used to describe quality is to consider it in
three necessary parts: structural, process, and outcome indicators 48 (the

40. CMS TECHNICAL USERS’ GUIDE, supra note 26, at 15.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 16.
43. Harkins, supra note 1.
44. CMS TECHNICAL USERS’ GUIDE, supra note 26, at 16.
45. Nursing Home Compare 3.0: Revisions to the Nursing Home Compare 5-Star Quality
Rating System, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Feb.12, 2015), https://www.cms.gov/
Newsroom/MediaReleaseDatabase/Fact-sheets/2015-Fact-sheets-items/2015-02-12-2.html
(stating that “the [W]ebsite gets more than 1.4 million visitors per year”).
46. Oberst, supra note 3.
47. CMS TECHNICAL USERS’ GUIDE, supra note 26, at 2.
48. Mary Ellen Dellefield et al., The Relationship Between Registered Nurses and Nursing
Home Quality: An Integrative Review (2008-2014), 33 NURSING ECON. 95, 98 (2015).
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Donabedian Model). 49 Structural measures include the number and skill mix of
staff, as well as overall organization and management of the facility. 50 The
staffing star is a pure structural indicator, measuring the input of the number of
staff, but the number of staff alone is insufficient to determine the quality of
care received. Another equally important piece includes the process by which
care is delivered in a nursing home. 51
Unfortunately, process measures historically have been very difficult to
measure and are therefore frequently not studied. 52 Process quality indicators
assess the way that care is provided in order to better residents’ experiences. 53
Examples of process quality indicators include the kinds of relationships the
care staff have with the residents and the ways in which problematic residents
are approached and erratic behaviors de-escalated. Further, “[c]are processes
used will differ based on resident characteristics, acuity, length of stay, and
types and numbers of nursing staff included in the nursing skill mix.” 54 The
Five-Star Quality Rating System does not identify or assess these kinds of
process indicators. But how care is provided cannot be easily separated from
the structural measure of staff, because the two influence one another. 55 To
measure only one reflects an inaccurate concept of quality. The third prong of
quality, outcome measures, assesses data including survey deficiency findings,
incidences of adverse events, and staffing turnover. 56
It is imperative that all three prongs are considered. 57 CMS, however, has
developed the faulty Five-Star Quality Rating System by using only the
staffing measure to assess structural indicators, by completely disregarding
procedural measures, and by relying predominately on outcome measures to
assess quality of care in nursing homes. Because the staffing rating only
addresses structural indicators and measures inputs (the numbers of staff), it
cannot accurately predict that good care will be provided. Although other
measures on the Website exist to better indicate quality, the staffing star
remains highly scrutinized and continues to be modified for accuracy.

49. JiSun Choi et al., Nursing Practice Environment and Registered Nurses’ Job Satisfaction
in Nursing Homes, 52 GERONTOLOGIST 484, 486 (2011) (explaining the Donabedian Model
wherein structure affects processes, which then affect care outcomes).
50. Dellefield et al., supra note 48.
51. Id. at 100.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Dellefield et al., supra note 48, at 100.
56. Id.
57. See Choi et al., supra note 49.
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III. THE STAFFING STAR
A.

Accounting for Specific Types and Numbers of Staff

Numbers and types of staff employed by a nursing home are often
considered important quantitative evidence used by plaintiffs’ attorneys and
the government to support arguments against nursing homes when issues
arise. 58 Specifically, evidence of the numbers and types of staff are often used
to argue that nursing homes failed to respond to residents’ needs, were overly
concerned with profit at the expense of resident care, and were negligent in
resident supervision. 59 To assess the numbers of staff available for care at a
given facility, CMS double counts RNs and also includes counts of LPNs and
NAs. 60 Relying on the numbers and types of staff alone, however, is
insufficient to give an accurate picture of the type of care an individual
receives. Additionally, the formula implicitly forces nursing homes to hire RNs
over other types of staff because the presence of RNs impacts the staffing
rating that displays on the Website.
An RN is an individual who has obtained at a minimum an associate’s
degree or a diploma from a nursing program, although many RNs have
bachelor degrees. 61 Additionally, RNs must pass a national licensure exam and
maintain other state-specific requirements. 62 In practice, RNs are responsible
for administering patients’ medicines and treatments, establishing care plans,
collaborating with physicians, and educating patients on illness management
and ongoing care. 63 To count the RNs at a nursing home, CMS includes all
RNs who provide direct patient care, the RN Director of Nursing, and any RNs
who perform administrative duties. 64
To become an LPN or LVN, a person completes a one-year degree or
diploma program and passes a licensure exam. 65 In practice, LPNs perform
basic medical tasks such as changing wound dressings and inserting catheters,

58. Jennifer Smith, Lawsuits Rattle Nursing Home Chains, WALL STREET J. (October 3,
2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/lawsuits-rattle-nursing-home-chains-1412368400.
59. See id.
60. CMS TECHNICAL USERS’ GUIDE, supra note 26, at 7.
61. BUREAU OF LABOR STATS., Occupational Outlook Handbook: Registered Nurses, U.S.
DEP’T OF LABOR, https://www.bls.gov/ooh/healthcare/registered-nurses.htm#tab-1 [hereinafter
Registered Nurses].
62. Id.
63. BUREAU OF LABOR STATS., Occupational Outlook Handbook: What Registered Nurses
Do, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, https://www.bls.gov/ooh/healthcare/registered-nurses.htm#tab-2.
64. CMS TECHNICAL USERS’ GUIDE, supra note 26, at 7.
65. BUREAU OF LABOR STATS., Occupational Outlook Handbook: How to Become a
Licensed Practical or Licensed Vocational Nurse, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, https://www.bls.gov/
ooh/healthcare/licensed-practical-and-licensed-vocational-nurses.htm#tab-4.
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personal care tasks like bathing and dressing, and ongoing monitoring of
patients’ health statuses. 66
An NA is “any individual providing nursing or nursing-related services to
residents in a nursing facility.” 67 NAs provide most care pertaining to feeding,
exercise, ADL “independence enhancement,” toileting, and incontinence
care. 68 An NA can take a short training course to become a certified nursing
assistant (CNA). 69 CNAs provide more than ninety percent of direct care to
residents of nursing homes, involving tasks like bathing, turning to avoid
pressure sores, toileting, meal assistance, and other personal care tasks that are
“necessary for comfort and avoiding further debilitation, disease, and
unnecessary death.” 70 Despite the brunt of labor-intensive work that CNAs
provide (often at minimum hourly wages), this type of care is largely
undervalued. 71
When counting the number of aides at a facility, CMS includes CNAs,
NAs, aides in training, and medication technicians. 72 These staffing categories
include many of the caregivers at a nursing home, but not all. For example, the
CMS calculations fail to include other vital staff who often provide other kinds
of direct care such as: activity assistants, hospice staff, and physical
therapists. 73 On any given day, a nursing home resident may be bathed and
dressed by a CNA, fed by a feeding assistant, have her social and emotional
needs addressed by activity assistants and social workers, be toileted by one of
many staff, receive medication from a medication technician, receive physical
therapy, have her blood pressure checked by an LPN, and her chart reviewed
by an RN. Failing to account for all of the staff who touch that resident’s care
in a given day reflects an inaccurate understanding of the multidisciplinary
approach to care in a nursing home.
Despite the wealth of staff at any facility that may impact patient care, the
Website star staffing ratios only reflect the numbers of staff with the specific
qualifications of RN, LPN, and CNA. 74 Considering the hypothetical resident
above, the staffing ratio therefore may only account for the staff who provide
the resident’s bathing and dressing, feeding, blood pressure check, medicine

66. Licensed Practical and Vocational Nurses, supra note 32.
67. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(b)(5)(F); 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-3(b)(5)(F).
68. John F. Schnelle et al., Relationship of Nursing Home Staffing to Quality of Care, 39
HEALTH SERVS. RES. 225, 226–27 (2004).
69. BUREAU OF LABOR STATS., Occupational Outlook Handbook: Nursing Assistants and
Orderlies, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, https://www.bls.gov/ooh/healthcare/nursing-assistants.htm#
tab-4 [hereinafter Nursing Assistants and Orderlies].
70. Lenhoff, supra note 23, at 15.
71. Id. at 18.
72. CMS TECHNICAL USERS’ GUIDE, supra note 26, at 7.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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administration, and chart review. However, the resident’s physical therapy,
palliative care, and social and cognitive needs are unaccounted for by the
current staffing ratio, and these are all services that are also important to the
health and quality of life of every resident. 75 By omitting other staff in its
calculations, CMS has placed a bias on certain types of staff with specific
credentials, implying that those credentials directly correspond with better
care. This bias by CMS, however, begs consideration of the question: why
shouldn’t the presence of all staff who contribute to the teamwork for caring
for residents be the consideration for awarding stars on the Website? For
example, disregarding activity staff, who plan and implement engaging
activities for the residents, neglects the fact that psychosocial health can
largely impact physical health. 76 The staffing selection that CMS uses turns a
blind eye to the interrelationship of factors that contribute to overall patient
well-being.
Further, CMS relies on data reported by facilities concerning the number
of staff the facility had during the past two weeks. 77 Compiling an accurate
view of staffing ratios in a facility, however, is much more complicated and
involves assembling and analyzing data from a variety of sources including the
staff schedules, punch cards, agency invoices, and daily census reports, among
others. 78 In an effort to reduce inaccurate reporting by nursing homes, section
6106 of the ACA mandates that by 2016, facilities shall report their staffing
statistics “based on payroll and other verifiable and auditable data.” 79 CMS
remains hopeful that its new database for submission of this data “will allow
staffing and census information to be collected on a regular and more frequent
basis than currently collected.” 80 The ACA requirement stops there, however;
no mandate is given to adjust the staffing rating formula to reflect more
realistic norms, and it still leaves open the possibility that data be compiled by
a mix of sources, as long as it is auditable.

75. See Anita DeLongis et al., The Impact of Daily Stress on Health and Mood:
Psychological and Social Resources as Mediators, 54 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 486,
487 (1988).
76. Id.
77. Christina Williams et al., Measuring Nursing Home Quality–The Five-Star Rating
System, SAS GLOBAL F. 2010 5 (2010), http://support.sas.com/resources/papers/proceedings10/
161-2010.pdf.
78. Proskauer Rose LLP, Nursing Facility Staffing: A Proactive and Defensive Look at
Nurse/Aide Staffing in SNFs 30, 46 (2008) (unpublished PowerPoint presentation).
79. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 11-148, § 6106, 124 Stat. 713
(2010).
80. Staffing Data Submission PBJ, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Jan. 14,
2016, 3:18 PM), https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Quality-Initiatives-Patient-Assessment-Instru
ments/NursingHomeQualityInits/Staffing-Data-Submission-PBJ.html [hereinafter Staffing Data
Submission PBJ].

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2016]

ADDING INSULT TO INJURY

195

Although the ACA attempts to fix issues surrounding staffing data, using
only one source of staffing data (i.e., payroll records) still may not be an
accurate representation of staff for a proper staff analysis because it is often
recorded in many places within an organization. For example, a single
employee may work multiple shifts, but in different units with individuals
requiring different levels of care, which may not be well-reflected on the
payroll data. 81 Additionally, the numbers of staff continue to be compared
against a prescribed ratio that is considered the optimal staff requirement;
however, the IOM has long held that simple staffing ratios are inadequate to
assess care due to the complex nature of case mixes in nursing homes. 82
Furthermore, while adding RNs can correlate with better quality, the
relationship is non-linear, and a point exists where adding more RNs produces
little to no quality improvement in a facility. 83 Thus, collecting the same type
of data, albeit more accurately, will not address the underlying problem that
numbers of staff are not reliable measures of quality.
B.

Adjusting for Case Mix Improperly

To adjust for differences in populations at different facilities, CMS claims
that it adjusts the required nurse staffing ratios for each facility according to
case mix. 84 Case mix is defined as the make up of residents with differing
levels of acuity in a given facility. 85 To begin its adjustment, CMS uses the
same RUG-III classification system it uses in its Medicare prospective
payment system to determine the different levels of care residents need. 86
Then, for each RUG-III group, a number is assigned for the expected minutes
of care by RNs, LPNs, and NAs. 87 These expected minutes were developed
from two CMS-sponsored Staff Time Measurement studies in 1995 and
1997. 88 Twenty years later, however, CMS still applies the same expected
minutes of care, despite advances in technology and care processes. 89
Since these criteria were developed, much has changed in health care
services, and it is important that the standards by which nursing homes are
judged reflect current care trends. Models of care have begun shifting from a
medical model to a person-centered model, which has brought about new
processes for interacting with residents and new design of nursing home
81. Id.
82. IOM REPORT, supra note 6, at 102.
83. Ning Jackie Zhang et al., Minimum Nurse Staffing Ratios for Nursing Homes, 24
NURSING ECON. 78, 80 fig.1 (2006).
84. Williams et al., supra note 77, at 3.
85. Id. at 5.
86. CMS TECHNICAL USERS’ GUIDE, supra note 26, at 2.
87. Id. at 18 tbl. A1.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 8.
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facilities. 90 One study found that nursing homes that had implemented a
person-centered care model tended to have fewer health-related survey
deficiencies as well as fewer RN and LPN staff, 91 which further indicates that
staff levels may not be a reliable indicator of health outcomes in facilities.
Additionally, implementation of new technologies in the nursing home setting
can reduce medical errors and increase resident safety. 92 For example, the rise
in electronic health records has helped coordinate care and allowed remote
access to important patient information. 93 This increased ability to access a
patient’s full records helps care teams “make knowledgeable decisions in
respect to [residents’] care plans” from more remote locations. 94 It follows,
therefore, that fewer on-site RN staff may be required if they can still perform
their chart review duties and make care plan decisions while off-site, without a
decline in patient care.
Another limitation on the current case-mix adjustment is that it does not
accurately represent individuals in facilities with cognitive impairments. CMS
makes Website users believe that the appropriate staffing standards to which
nursing homes are held are adjusted for each facility based on the different
RUG-III groups that are assigned to its specific residents. 95 Data compiled on
each individual in a facility helps determine which RUG-III group applies to
each resident, taking into account the resident’s needs. 96 Since the RUG-III
system was developed, efforts to more accurately represent the complexities of
patient conditions while maintaining some sort of uniformity has led to
continuing addition of RUG-III groups. 97 Now, the system that nursing homes
use comprises fifty-three different categories of patient conditions. 98
Additionally, there are two different methods (hierarchal and index) of
determining which category fits a patient, leading to potential confusion for
providers when selecting the appropriate RUG-III group to submit for billing
purposes. 99

90. Sonya E. Bowen & Sheryl Zimmerman, Understanding and Improving Psychosocial
Services in Long-Term Care, HEALTH CARE FIN. REV., Winter 2008–2009, at 1, 3.
91. David C. Grabowski et al., Who Are the Innovators? Nursing Homes Implementing
Culture Change, 54 GERONTOLOGIST S65, S72 (2014).
92. INT’L FED’N ON AGEING, LONG TERM CARE AND TECHNOLOGY: FINAL REPORT 8
(2012), http://www.ifa-fiv.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/som-2012-ltc-and-technology-final-re
port.pdf.
93. Id. at 5.
94. Id.
95. CMS TECHNICAL USERS’ GUIDE, supra note 26, at 8.
96. Id.
97. Rena Shephard, Making the Most of RUG-53, LONG-TERM LIVING MAG. (Feb. 1, 2006),
http://www.ltlmagazine.com/article/making-most-rug-53.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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Further complicating the categorization system is the fact that many
residents in nursing homes are long-term residents, not expecting any major
improvement in health conditions or rehabilitation. In 2015, the Kaiser Family
Foundation (KFF) released a report indicating that as many as eighty-one
percent of Medicare beneficiaries in nursing homes require assistance with one
or more ADLs, and seventy-six percent of the same population suffers from
mental or cognitive impairments. 100 For all of these residents requiring ADL
assistance, CNAs are the appropriate care staff to assist in the bathing,
dressing, toileting, and other personal care needs. 101 The same KFF report
indicated that only fifty-five percent of Medicare beneficiaries in nursing
homes suffer from “fair/poor health,” requiring the kind of care that an LPN or
RN would normally provide. 102 This data indicates that a majority of residents
in nursing homes may not be expected to gain improved function or renewed
health; rather, they reside there for the ADL assistance and supervision the
facility can provide (often because of degenerative cognitive impairments like
dementia).
Of the fifty-three RUG-III groups currently identified, only four cover
impaired cognition, with another four under the category of “behavior.” 103 The
remaining RUG-III categories are all specific to physical conditions, many of
which may not be applicable to facilities with large populations of relatively
physically healthy individuals with dementia. 104 For these types of nursing
homes, the wide range of residents with different cognitive impairments are
limited to only four (or eight if including “behavioral” RUGs) different groups
with expected staff time standards. For example, cognitive impairment can be
caused by a variety of different conditions, including stroke, traumatic brain
injury, Alzheimer’s disease, or other types of dementia, and each one of these
conditions creates different cognitive, physical, and behavioral effects. 105 This
lack of diversity among the “cognitive impairment RUGs” fails to represent the
wide diversity of needs that different individuals with dementia can require.
Although section 6106 requires the data that facilities report to include casemix data, 106 little will change if the underlying way in which case-mix is
identified remains unchanged.

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Boccuti et al., supra note 11, at 2 fig. 1.
Lenhoff, supra note 23, at 15.
Boccuti et al., supra note 11.
CMS TECHNICAL USERS’ GUIDE, supra note 26, at 19 tbl. A1.
Id. at 18–19 tbl. A1.
Cognitive Impairment: A Call for Action, Now!, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION 2 (Feb. 2011), https://www.cdc.gov/aging/pdf/cognitive_impairment/cogimp_poili
cy_final.pdf.
106. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 11-148, § 6106, 124 Stat. 713
(2010) (amending § 1128I of the Social Security Act to include (g)(2)).
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IV. STAFFING: AN INCOMPLETE MEASURE OF QUALITY
Even if the current method for compiling staff data was reliable and the
case-mix adjustment was more appropriately sensitive, measuring the numbers
of staff in a facility is still not a reliable indicator of quality. Some nursing
homes exist with exemplary staffing and poor quality according to CMS
standards, 107 but if the number of staff is positively correlated with quality,
then how can a facility have a five-star staff rating and only a two-star quality
rating? The formula that CMS uses to award stars on the Website for numbers
of staff comes from one CMS-sponsored study, and that study found that nurse
staffing ratios had a positive correlation with nursing home quality of care. 108
This one study was CMS’s basis for creating its current formula that double
counts RNs. 109
A NURSING HOME WITH FIVE STARS FOR STAFFING AND TWO STARS FOR
QUALITY 110

Other independent studies have concluded that the correlations are much
more complex, however. For example, one study found that “some care
processes were poorly implemented in even the highest-staffed facilities,
despite the fact that these facilities had sufficient numbers of NAs to
potentially provide 100 percent of care to all residents.” 111 Another study
found no significant relationship between measuring staff time (hours per
resident day) and quality outcomes, even though the CMS staffing formula
compares the facility’s hours per resident day to the national and expected

107. See NURSING HOME COMPARE, https://www.medicare.gov/nursinghomecompare/
(search zip code “63017”, then arrange results by staffing in descending order) (last visited Dec.
14, 2016).
108. Williams et al., supra note 77.
109. Id.
110. NURSING HOME COMPARE, supra note 107.
111. Schnelle et al., supra note 68, at 246–47.
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hours per resident day. 112 It has therefore been shown multiple times that staff
numbers cannot guarantee or even predict good care outcomes. Actually, thirty
years ago, the IOM even admitted that quality of care and quality of life are
dependent on the attitudes and behavior of staff, not necessarily the number of
staff in nursing homes. 113 Further, the IOM stated that quality in nursing
homes is complex, and even “regulation is not sufficient to ensure high quality
of care and quality of life in nursing homes.” 114 CMS failed to account for
these recognitions, however, by limiting the staff star ratings to purely staff
numbers. Admittedly, using a quantitative measure of staff is significantly
easier than qualitative measures, but taking the easy route at the expense of
accuracy produces incomplete measurements and unreliable data. These
incomplete indicators about staff at a facility are then published on the
Website, where consumers rely on the information to make their long-term
care choices.
One reason that the quantity of staff is not a reliable indicator of care is
that management and other workplace matters factor largely into the staff
composition in any workplace environment. Poor workplace environments and
job dissatisfaction contribute to high staff turnover. 115 The nursing home
industry is notorious for high staff turnover rates, in large part because of the
labor intensive nature of jobs in nursing homes. 116 The kind of care that
residents require can be physically and emotionally taxing, which can lead to
“far-reaching consequences, including increased facility operating costs and
lower caregiver job satisfaction . . . . The most serious consequence of
caregiver turnover is the potential negative health outcomes for residents.” 117
Staff turnover may have serious effects including interference with continuity
of care, lack of experienced staff, weakened standards of care, and
psychological distress for some residents. 118 Rightfully, CMS is concerned
about health outcomes for residents, 119 but its analysis stops too short: it fails
to address workplace factors that affect the staff numbers. This incomplete
analysis disregards the larger picture by focusing only on a snapshot of the
quantity of staff at a specific time.

112. Greg Arling et al., Nursing Effort and Quality of Care for Nursing Home Residents, 47
GERONTOLOGIST 672, 680 (2007).
113. IOM REPORT, supra note 6, at 171.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 101.
116. Lenhoff, supra note 23, at 21; Nicholas G. Castle et al., Nursing Home Staff Turnover:
Impact on Nursing Home Compare Quality Measures, 47 GERONTOLOGIST 650, 650 (2007).
117. Castle et al., supra note 116.
118. Id. at 652.
119. IOM REPORT, supra note 6 (referring to the correlation its study found between
outcomes and the number of staff in nursing homes).
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If a workplace can provide higher wages, benefits, scheduling flexibility,
advancement opportunities, and better working conditions, however, staff may
find better job satisfaction. 120 A strong positive correlation has been found
between RN job satisfaction and the chance to participate in facility affairs,
supportive managers, and access to adequate resources to perform their jobs. 121
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of these findings was the correlation
between RN job satisfaction and availability of adequate resources. The term
“adequate resources” is defined as “the presence of appropriate support
services and sufficient staffing that enable RNs to accomplish their work,
spend adequate time with their residents, and provide a high level of quality
care.” 122 While these resources may include technology and tools provided by
the facility, another very important resource is care staff, including the CNAs,
aides, feeding assistants, activity assistants, social workers, and other integral
(and often overlooked) staff in the nursing home. Therefore, what RNs may
need in order to improve their job satisfaction is more care staff to perform the
personal care tasks, so that RNs can better focus on the true medical needs of
residents. This finding suggests that an emphasis on providing greater numbers
of support staff may go a long way in helping RNs experience higher job
satisfaction, and subsequently, decreased turnover rates. 123 Encouraging
facilities to improve these other measures like wages, participation in facility
affairs, better management, and resources, staff turnover would decrease, and
longer tenure of staff would allow for deeper relationships to be created among
staff and residents. 124
In sum, it has been long held that because of the complexities of the
population within each nursing home, simple staffing ratios are improper.
Additionally, the care residents receive is affected by many more factors than
merely the number of RNs, LPNs, and CNAs that a nursing home employs.
Workplace environment, available resources, and management structure are
some of the few interrelated aspects of working in a nursing home that
contribute to the care provided, and addressing those aspects may produce
greater effects than simply increasing the RNs on payroll. Although the
staffing star will continue to remain an incomplete predictor of care, the ACA
attempts to ensure that the data used in the faulty formula is correct. 125

120. Lenhoff, supra note 23, at 21.
121. Choi et al., supra note 49, at 489.
122. Id. at 490.
123. Id.
124. Lenhoff, supra note 23, at 21.
125. See generally Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 11-148, § 6106,
124 Stat. 713 (2010).
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V. SECTION 6106: A RESPONSE TO “GAMING THE SYSTEM”
A.

Allegations of “Gaming the System”

The Five-Star Quality Rating System has recently come under scrutiny due
to allegations that nursing homes falsify the staffing data that they submit to
the Website in order to achieve greater star ratings, 126 and a 2015 study found
evidence that as many as eighty percent of nursing homes were inflating their
staffing data for the Website. 127 Although other studies have not yet reaffirmed
these results, such a high percentage of nursing homes alleged to be falsifying
data is cause for concern. Eighty percent is a large majority of the industry,
which indicates a systemic problem rather than a few bad actors. As discussed
at length in this paper already, the systemic problem is the formula which
awards having more RNs on staff, although such a measure does not
adequately measure care.
B.

Section 6106

Section 6106 of the ACA, which requires that “the Secretary shall require a
facility to electronically submit to the Secretary direct care staffing information
(including information with respect to agency and contract staff) based on
payroll and other verifiable and auditable data,” 128 attempts to solve the
problem of data falsification. Additionally, the statute requires specific data to
be reported regularly, including the level of certification of each staff member,
resident case mix, hours of care provided by each type of staff member, and
“information on employee turnover and tenure.” 129 In order to facilitate section
6106’s requirement, CMS has implemented a uniform data collection system,
called the Payroll-Based Journal. 130
The goal behind this new reporting system is to curb the “gaming of the
system” that is cause for concern in the industry, 131 but the concern with false
staffing data should not be the main priority because the underlying staffing
data is still mostly meaningless. Ideally, with standardized data requirements,
nursing homes will no longer submit staffing data with inflated numbers of
RNs. But if the allegation that as many as eighty percent of nursing homes are
inflating their data is correct, after section 6106 implementation, the same

126. See, e.g., N. Am. Health Care, 2015 WL 6871781, at *1.
127. Jeff Kelly Lowenstein, Analysis Shows Widespread Discrepancies in Staffing Levels
Reported by Nursing Homes, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Feb. 13, 2015, 2:49 PM),
https://www.publicintegrity.org/2014/11/12/16246/analysis-shows-widespread-discrepanciesstaffing-levels-reported-nursing-homes.
128. See ACA § 6106(g).
129. Id.
130. Staffing Data Submission PBJ, supra note 80.
131. See id.
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formula will be creating star ratings but with data that implicates lower staff
numbers. Therefore, the only apparent trend will be an overall decrease in
staffing ratings for most nursing homes on the Website.
Section 6106 therefore risks undermining any confidence consumers may
have in the nursing home industry to provide good care. For example, a
caregiver who visits the Website for updates on a loved one’s nursing home
may see that the staffing rating has declined. The consumer may then
implicitly equate a lower rating on the Website with a lower standard of care
and begin imagining greater faults with her loved one’s facility. This paper has
shown, however, that the staffing star does not accurately implicate quality of
care; an overall decrease of star ratings will only further disillusion consumers
with the industry as long as CMS continues to claim its staffing stars are
reliable indicators of any valuable information about a nursing home.
Perhaps behind the motivation of section 6106 is the attempt to encourage
nursing homes to actually improve their staffing numbers, rather than merely
inflating the data. What section 6106 fails to account for, however, is the fact
that nursing homes will still not be able to meet the demands that the faulty
rating system requires. Doing so would require nursing homes to actually
increase the amount of RNs on staff, which is likely to prove cost prohibitive
for such a narrow-margin industry. 132
C. Nursing Homes Will Still Be Unable to Meet the Higher Staffing
Standards
In order to increase RN numbers, nursing homes will have to spend more
money on payroll, and that money has to come from somewhere, whether it is
from increased reimbursement rates, raising the rates for private pay patients,
or some other income-generating activity. In 2006, a study about the
economics of nursing assessed the relative costs a nursing home would incur in
order to increase its RN staffing. 133 The study found that an increase of twentyfive percent in quality measures via addition of more staff RNs would cost an
average of $23.51 extra per resident, per day; 134 this amount translates to a
monthly increase in expenses of $2,233 per month for additional RNs to meet
the increase in quality measures. A majority of nursing homes are funded
predominately by Medicare and Medicaid, however, which already reimburse

132. J. K. Wall, Nursing Home Profits Surge as Owners Seek Moratorium, INDIANAPOLIS
BUS. J. (Feb. 15, 2014), http://www.ibj.com/articles/46158-nursing-home-profits-surge-as-owners
-seek-moratorium (noting that most nursing homes operate on a two-to-four percent net profit
margin).
133. See generally Zhang et al., supra note 83.
134. Id. at 85.
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facilities at below market rates. 135 Without any evidence that Medicare and
Medicaid will suddenly begin reimbursing nursing homes at break-even rates,
nursing homes will have to bear the cost themselves. 136
Yet, the Five-Star Quality Rating System is blind to the economic
pressures of nursing homes, adding its own pressures for nursing homes to
employ more RNs and figure out the finances regardless. 137 Despite the fact
that the government is the largest payer for nursing homes and consistently
underpays for the services provided, it remains a common perception that
every nursing home “put[s] revenue over residents,” and cuts corners at the
expense of patients to maximize profits. 138 But the numbers show otherwise: to
provide adequate care for residents, a typical nursing home loses almost twenty
dollars per day per Medicaid resident due to the under-reimbursement by the
federal health programs. 139 Most nursing homes operate on a two-to-four
percent net profit, which leaves very little room to plan for unexpected
expenses, upgrade facilities, or employ more staff. 140
These opposing pressures—adding more RNs and working within the
inadequate reimbursement rates—are both supplied directly by CMS, and it
makes the financial situation for nursing homes appear unsustainable. Seventy
percent of an average nursing home’s budget already is spent on payroll. 141
Further, RNs are the costliest of the employees a nursing home may hire; the
average hourly wage for an RN is $32.45, 142 while the average hourly wage for
an LPN and CNA is $20.76, 143 and $12.36, respectively. 144
For most facilities operating on very tight income margins, operating under
the pressure to hire more RNs, which cost significantly more than other care
staff, may result in a facility filling jobs better suited for LPNs and/or CNAs

135. See generally Charlene Harrington et al., Nursing Facilities, Staffing, Residents, and
Facility Deficiencies, 2009 Through 2014, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Aug. 4, 2015), https://kaiser
familyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2015/08/8761-nursing-facilities-staffing-residents-andfacility-deficiencies.pdf.
136. See Mary Ellen Biery, Taking the Pulse of Nursing Care Centers, FORBES (Mar. 22,
2012, 9:53 am.), http://www.forbes.com/sites/sageworks/2012/03/22/taking-the-pulse-of-nursingcare-centers/.
137. See ELJAY, L.L.C. & HANSEN HUNTER & CO., P.C., A REPORT IN SHORTFALLS IN
MEDICAID FUNDING FOR NURSING CENTER CARE 22 (2015), https://www.ahcancal.org/re
search_data/funding/Documents/2014%20Medicaid%20Underfunding%20for%20Nursing%20
Center%20Care%20FINAL.pdf.
138. Smith, supra note 58.
139. Biery, supra note 136.
140. Wall, supra note 132.
141. Lois A. Bowers, 2015 Business Outlook: Staffing, LONG-TERM LIVING MAG., Dec. 17,
2014, http://www.ltlmagazine.com/article/2015businessoutlookstaffing.
142. Registered Nurses, supra note 61.
143. Licensed Practical and Licensed Vocational Nurses, supra note 32.
144. Nursing Assistants and Orderlies, supra note 69.
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with RNs instead. To balance its budget, a facility may even replace three
CNAs with one RN. Such a move may help increase the facility’s rating on the
Website because the staffing ratio rewards RNs. However, forcing an RN to
fill the job duties usually assigned to LPNs or CNAs is likely to be
dissatisfying for the RNs who hoped to perform the types of judgment calls
and assessment tasks they learned about in school. This sentiment was
highlighted in one research study where one RN reported, “as a new grad I
need to be exposed to a hospital environment to hone my skills and I just do
not see getting that clinical experience [in this nursing home].” 145 Instead, RNs
in nursing homes will continue to perform mostly personal care like toileting,
bathing, and dressing because the majority of care in a nursing home that is
required is personal care assistance. 146 In 2014, the average nursing home
resident received RN care for 0.47 hours each day, while the average care
received by direct care staff was 3.73 hours per day. 147 Further, the kind of
work required of RNs in nursing homes usually involves minimally basic
nursing skills. 148 Thus, if RNs find themselves filled into jobs where a majority
of their tasks are to assist residents with ADLs, the RNs are likely to become
dissatisfied and possibly even disgruntled.
The aforementioned study also found that as RN education level increased
(diploma level, associate’s degree, bachelor’s degree, and master’s degree), job
satisfaction of working in the nursing home setting drastically decreased. 149
This inverse linear relationship alludes to the desires among highly educated
professionals to employ their knowledge and critical thinking skills in their
jobs at a greater level, and if those skills are not properly used, job
dissatisfaction tends to result. 150 Not only is a reduction in RN job satisfaction
a concern for patient care, it can also lead to higher staff turnover, as RNs seek
more complex experiences in acute care settings like hospitals. 151 However,
hospitals themselves are currently experiencing issues maintaining a steady
workforce of RNs, and to encourage staff loyalty, hospitals are able to provide

145. Michael Shipley, Factors Contributing To Registered Nurse Job Satisfaction In the
Nursing Home, at 94 (May 14, 2015) (unpublished PhD dissertation, Seton Hall University),
http://scholarship.shu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3052&context=dissertations.
146. See Dellefield et al., supra note 48, at 95 (noting that historically a majority of direct
care provided to residents has been by LPNs and CNAs).
147. Id.
148. Lenhoff, supra note 23, at 23.
149. Shipley, supra note 145, at 80 fig. 5.
150. Introduction: The Workplace and Society, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/_
sec/media/reports/dunlop/section1.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2016).
151. See Shipley, supra note 145 (quoting an RN’s desire to hone her skills in an acute care
environment).
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salary increases and bonuses in attempts to recruit or keep the good RNs. 152
Nursing homes, however, working usually on minimal income budgets, 153 lack
the financial resources to make an already unappealing workplace environment
for nurses financially appealing.
In sum, the ability to recruit and keep RNs in the nursing home setting is
only getting worse. With the government continuing its pressure for nursing
homes to have more RNs, facilities find themselves in difficult positions—
needing the numbers of staff to have a good Website rating while not being
able to incentivize enough RN staff to want to work for them. Such competing
pressures are unsustainable. Additionally, without an increase in funding for
staffing to accommodate the increased mandatory staff ratios, nursing homes
may have to cut costs in other areas, which could further impact the overall
quality of care that the facility can provide. 154
In order to meet staffing requirements, many facilities are forced to hire
outside agency staff on a temporary basis, even though use of agency staff is
more costly and has been linked with lower quality of care. 155 Hiring more
staff under these circumstances “affect[s] equilibrium wages, alter[s] non-staff
resources, and [changes] the mix of quality through a substitution effect as
nursing homes change their use of labor.” 156 But, as this paper has
demonstrated, in order to bump up an extra star online (or to avoid a loss in
star rating), this shift in labor comes with high costs and decline in care.
Therefore, the pressures that the Website creates for nursing homes to maintain
a certain amount of RNs, without accounting for other staffing factors or the
costs involved, has strong forces that inhibit improvements in quality; it
actually may be worsening quality of care rather than improving it.
VI. CALL FOR ACTION: STRIKE THE STAFFING STAR
A.

No Oversight Over CMS Exists

The monumental impact that CMS continues to impose on the nursing
home industry highlights the great extent to which this administrative agency
has been allowed to act outside the scope of its authority. Although Congress

152. Beth Kutscher, Stronger Economy Drives More Nursing Turnover, Higher Wages, MOD.
HEALTHCARE (Nov. 17, 2015), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20151117/NEWS/1511
19897.
153. Wall, supra note 132.
154. John R. Bowblis, Staffing Ratios and Quality: An Analysis of Minimum Direct Care
Staffing Requirements for Nursing Homes, 46 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 1495, 1496 (2011).
155. Nicholas G. Castle & John Engberg, The Influence of Staffing Characteristics on Quality
of Care in Nursing Homes, 42 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 1822, 1843 (2007).
156. Bowblis, supra note 154, at 1500.
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delegated some authority to the agency through statute, 157 CMS has clearly
overstepped what it was granted—through both inaction and action. By failing
to comply with OBRA’s mandate through inaction, CMS has been permitted to
continue its operations while virtually ignoring Congress’s instructions. 158 In
the private sector, if an employee refuses to perform a task requested by a
supervisor, the employee would be reprimanded or terminated. Yet here, no
sanctions have been imposed that would enforce Congress’s authority to
mandate that CMS take action. Instead of being censured for failure to act,
CMS and other administrative agencies have continued to operate virtually
unchecked, gaining power and authority to a point where they are sometimes
referred to as the “fourth branch of government.” 159 Although administrative
agencies historically have helped administer law in a growing nation, being
described as another branch of government indicates their powers have grown
too large; this growth interferes with the nation’s constitutional tripartite
system.
As if Congress has recognized the overreaching of CMS in its rating
systems, it has mandated an investigation of the rating system through section
6107. But Congress has fallen short of creating any enforceable change; the
statute provides no enforcement mechanism to ensure CMS complies, leaving
CMS with no incentive to change.
In addition to its inaction concerning OBRA, CMS has added insult to
injury by creating the Website and the Five-Star Quality Rating System. Where
CMS admits the standards of assessing quality of care are faulty, and a lengthy
discussion in this paper has highlighted the extreme degree to which the
staffing standard is erroneous, no mandate exists for the standards to ever be
rectified. CMS only has had the ability to move forward with this action due to
a lack of oversight and enforcement mechanisms to ensure CMS’s assessments
of data are first and foremost reliable. Continuation of this lack of oversight
will only perpetuate CMS’s ability to impose standards that work against
quality, an issue that creates widespread negative implications for health care
provision and the sustainability of an industry that provides a vital service.

157. Social Security Act of 1935, 42 U.S.C. § 1395hh(a) (2006) (pursuant to this authority the
Secretary created the Health Care Financing Administration, which was eventually renamed as
the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services). See also generally CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND
MEDICAID SVCS., MILESTONES 1937-2015 (2015), https://www.cms.gov/About-CMS/AgencyInformation/History/Downloads/Medicare-and-Medicaid-Milestones-1937-2015.pdf.
158. See generally Harkins, supra note 1. See also Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 839
(1985) (noting that an agency decision not to act is presumptively non-reviewable by courts).
159. Elizabeth Slattery, Who Will Regulate the Regulators? Administrative Agencies, the
Separation of Powers, and Chevron Deference, HERITAGE FOUND. 3 (May 7, 2015),
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/05/who-will-regulate-the-regulators-administra
tive-agencies-the-separation-of-powers-and-chevron-deference.
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Imposing oversight mechanisms for such a powerful and longstanding
government agency is likely outside the reach of the near future. First, the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which governs administrative agencies,
does not apply to “agency action that is committed to agency discretion by
law.” 160 Usually the enforcement decisions of an agency fall under this
category, 161 which means that if CMS chooses not to enforce something, the
APA limits a court’s power to review the agency’s choice. If the solution were
to increase judicial oversight over CMS, precedent shows us that the judiciary
is likely to continue giving deference to administrative agencies. 162
Additionally, in order for a case to have standing in court, a demonstrable harm
would have to occur to a nursing home as a result of CMS’s use of an
erroneous staffing formula. Such proof would be nearly impossible to provide,
and thus, judicial oversight of CMS in this respect is unlikely. Further, taking
this issue to the courts requires an increase in nursing home litigation, a
process which requires vast resources that are better spent on providing
services and amenities to improve residents’ qualities of life. Litigation would
also take many years to resolve, and with the imminently growing elderly
population, the problem needs to be fixed sooner rather than later. The policy
implication remains, however, that CMS should not able to unilaterally
determine that greater numbers of RNs necessarily leads to better quality of
care.
B.

CMS as a Market Power

As both a government agency and the largest payer of health care services,
CMS sits in a delicate position where it must regulate for the good of all yet
also perform as a business to ensure its funds are being spent appropriately. 163
Through Medicare and Medicaid, CMS dominates the health care market,
thereby having enormous power to control how the industry is run. 164 If CMS
decides that more RNs are necessary, it can choose to set standards that risk
decertifying nursing homes, or it can publish data that makes certain nursing
homes appear to the public to be poor providers. 165 No matter what the
standards, nursing homes rely on payments from CMS, so if CMS says

160. Administrative Procedure Act § 701(a)(2), 5 U.S.C. § 701.
161. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Resources Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–44
(1984).
162. Id. at 844.
163. Bruce Patsner, Marketing Approval Versus Cost of New Medical Technologies in the Era
of Comparative Effectiveness: CMS, not FDA, Will Be the Primary Player, 3 J. HEALTH & LIFE
SCI. L. 38, 55 (Apr. 2010).
164. Id. at 43.
165. See generally NURSING HOME COMPARE, supra note 25.
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“jump,” a nursing home must jump, or risk serious financial consequences. 166
Thus, CMS has the ultimate power to destroy a nursing home’s business if
CMS believes the facility is not meeting the agency’s self-determined
standards. Such power over such a vital industry should be taken seriously and
exercised correctly.
With this power, CMS interrupts the free market trends that would
normally exist between consumers and skilled nursing facilities. 167 If the free
market were able to influence quality in nursing homes, the poorer performing
facilities would flounder while the exceptional facilities would shine, by virtue
of public opinion and free consumer choice. 168 By publishing the star ratings,
however, CMS provides its own opinion of the provision of care in nursing
homes, which consumers often rely on before developing their own opinions
first. 169 Those consumers looking to find skilled nursing care are typically
vulnerable, having experienced a decline in the health of oneself or a loved one
that requires transition to twenty-four hour care. 170 At this point, consumers
use the Website information to choose which facility will be the care provider,
and although transfers between homes are possible, significant barriers—
including financial constraints (like Medicaid as payment source), “not having
a spouse (who can advocate for transfers),” 171 psychological and physical
risks, and limited information about actual quality of care—exist as pressures
keeping transfer rates low between facilities. 172 The low incidence of transfers
between facilities shows that when an initial place of care is determined, it is
likely to be the sole provider of care for a resident.
Therefore, the information that a consumer uses to decide where to receive
care is extremely important, and because CMS advertises that its data
represents the quality of care one can expect to receive, it should be
meaningful, correct, and impartial. But CMS is not impartial—it has a strong

166. James E. Utterback, Substituting an Iron Fist for the Invisible Hand: The False Claims
Act and Nursing Home Quality of Care – A Legal and Economic Perspective, 10 QUINNIPIAC
HEALTH L. J. 113, 167 (stating that “[nursing homes] must adapt or risk going out of business”).
167. Id. at 164.
168. See id.
169. Barbara Peters Smith, Nursing Home Star Ratings Change Make it Tougher to Shine,
HERALD-TRIB. (Feb. 20, 2015), http://health.heraldtribune.com/2015/02/20/nursing-home-starratings-change-makes-tougher-shine/.
170. Long Term Care: Transfers Between Nursing Homes are Fairly Common, but Barriers
to Transfer Exist for Some Patients, AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE RES. & QUALITY (June 2000),
http://archive.ahrq.gov/research/jun00/0600RA15.htm.
171. Id.
172. Richard A. Hirth et al., Does Quality Influence Consumer Choice of Nursing Homes?
Evidence from Nursing Home to Nursing Home Transfer, 40 INQUIRY 343, 344 (Winter 2003–
2004).
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interest in making sure the money it spends is used wisely. 173 And it has found
how to meet that interest by guiding the public’s choices. In 2015, a CMS
administrator even admitted that the star ratings are important because they
help guide the decisions of consumers. 174 Even if the original intent behind the
Website was to promote access to information about the quality of care in
nursing homes, 175 left to its own devices, CMS has used the Website to guide
consumers towards facilities that perform well according to the erroneous
standards it dictates.
In sum, consumers usually approach the Website seeking information as
new entrants to the skilled nursing care market, yet they lack substantive
background knowledge of what factors are important, so the Website provides
that information for them. Since this information comes from CMS, which
should be an impartial agency, consumers rely on what the Website says. If
CMS rates one facility higher than another, it better have accurate and
important data to back up such an assertion. But as this paper has shown, CMS
does not have accurate data to indicate that the staff a facility provides will
provide better care.
C. Remove the Staffing Rating
It is clear that the current portrayal of staffing data on the Website cannot
continue. The data is a highly inaccurate indicator of the care that is provided
in facilities, and it is a strong driver of the choices that consumers make about
which facility to use. Further, the probability of bringing action to courts to
enforce that CMS is advertising accurate data is unlikely.
The easiest solution, therefore, is to eliminate the Website’s staffing star.
The staffing formula is inaccurate, and it places a bias on one specific
quantitative measure—the number of RNs. Highlighting this one data point
reflects to consumers that it is necessarily more important than other potential
measures, and if a nursing home performs poorly on this one data measure, it
implies to consumers the nursing home will provide poor care. Section 6106
continues to place emphasis on this one point of data and requires even greater
resources to focus on adjusting this measure, but as shown herein, it still does
not fix anything.
By getting rid of staffing altogether as a measure, the actual quality
measures become more visible and more important. Staffing is an input-based

173. 2016 CMS QUALITY STRATEGY REP. 2 (discussing CMS’s initiatives to “transform the
health care system into one that . . . spend[s] our health care dollars in a smarter way”).
174. Smith, supra note 169 (quoting Patrick Conway, Deputy Administrator for Innovation
and Quality and Chief Medical Officer at CMS: “when there’s bunching or grouping at the high
point of the scale, it doesn’t help [consumers] make decisions”).
175. Jan P. Clement et al., Nursing Home Price and Public Quality Information, 47 HEALTH
SERVS. RES., Feb. 2012, at 86, 87.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

210

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 10:183

structural measure, 176 yet as this paper has shown, the input of more RNs does
not necessarily create better care. Without the staffing star, consumers will be
able to focus on the important output-based quality measures that the Website
displays—namely the quality star and overall star associated with each facility.
If quality of care is the main concern for consumers and CMS, then the quality
measures should shine without being displayed alongside the staffing star,
which is effectively meaningless.
VII. CONCLUSION
With the GAO investigation under way pursuant to section 6107, the time
is ripe for revision of the standards that CMS uses in determining its ratings.
By creating a new data reporting method, section 6106 impliedly admits that a
problem exists with the current model of staffing data and Nursing Home
Compare, but the solution that it proffers fails to address the underlying faulty
formula that is improperly biased towards more RN staff. Without an
adjustment of the way in which the staffing ratings are determined, nursing
homes will still face pressure to employ more RNs or falsify staffing data
despite the fact that increasing RNs does not necessarily lead to better care
outcomes. And as this paper has shown, it can lead to exactly the opposite—a
decline in care quality.
Additionally, although the GAO is ordered to report its findings of its
investigation to Congress, the ACA stops short by requiring neither Congress
nor CMS to act on those findings. Much like the failure to act on the finding
that assessing quality in nursing homes was not easily measurable in the late
1980’s, no oversight exists to ensure that whatever the results of the GAO
investigation reveal will actually be used to implement meaningful change.
Rather than encouraging more judicial oversight over CMS or proposing
legislation to hold CMS accountable, the single most practical solution to
rectify the inaccurate staff data is to simply remove it from the Website and to
revert to IOM’s message from over two decades ago: “Because of the
complexities of case mix—that is, the widely differing needs of individual
residents in the same facility—prescribing simple staffing ratios clearly is
inappropriate.” 177 As the Baby Boomers age, more elders will be placed in
nursing homes, 178 regardless of the staffing star’s impact on quality of care.
Without a change in the staffing rating, however, consumers’ perception of the
quality of care they receive will decline because the Website is a strong driver

176. See Dellefield et al., supra note 48; Choi et al., supra note 49 (explaining the
Donabedian Model).
177. IOM REPORT, supra note 6, at 102.
178. Storrs, supra note 12.
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of consumers’ opinions. Yet as nursing homes fill with residents and transfers
between facilities remain rare, consumers will enter the facilities with already
marred opinions, which may color their entire experience in skilled nursing care.
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